

Carbon Regulation: Policies, Trends & Impacts

LPSC ARRA Seminar on Clean Air Markets

February 24, 2011

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Overview

- Considerable national and international attention has been given to this issue.
- The current increase in energy prices and challenges in supply capabilities confound climate change issues and approaches.
- GHG regulation also raises considerable questions about market organization and structure in restructured energy markets.
- Uncertainty and "policy volatility" creates challenges for the high levels of expensive investment considered needed to address this issue.
- Policies are likely to result in the most dramatic restructuring of energy markets to date.

Policy Approaches for Addressing (Carbon) Emissions

Policy Frameworks

| Policy Type | Definition |
|---|---|
| Carbon Tax | Places a fixed tax on end-user energy usage. |
| Cap and Trade (Upstream, Carbon Content) | Would require upstream producers of energy resources to acquire credits based upon the carbon content of the fuel mined or produced. |
| Cap and Trade (Downstream, Emissions Type) | Would require certain emitting sectors to acquire emission credits for fuel burned in production processes. |
| Standards | Would change the efficiency (emissions) standards of appliances, motors, equipment, automobiles, etc. |

Carbon Policy Tradeoffs


| Policies Criteria | Carbon Tax | Cap & Trade -Upstream- (carbon content) | Cap & Trade -Downstream- (source emissions) | Standards (Vehicles, Appliances, Buildings) |
|---------------------------------|---|--|---|--|
| Economic Efficiency | High to Medium – but depends on (1) coverage (2) rate (3) reallocation of tax revenues. Exemptions reduces efficiency. | High to Medium depends on potential exemptions, fuel quality issues and adjustments, liquidity. Administrative costs can be lower than downstream C&T. | Medium to Low – addressing transportation is difficult and administratively complex. Sector exemption greatly reduces efficiency. Substitutes and alternatives likely challenged. | Medium to Low – highly dependent upon standards design, timing and implementation. |
| Applicability and Uniformity | High - without exemptions | Medium to High - Subject to allocations | Medium to Low – depends on sector coverage. | Low – some sectors (residential and commercial) would bear bigger burden. |
| Gaming Potential | Low | Medium to High – property right is "commoditized." Regulation of commodity will be an issue. | Medium to High – property right is "commoditized." Regulation of commodity will be an issue | Medium |
| Simplicity | High | Medium to Low | Low | Medium to low (from administrative perspective). |
| Cost Predictability | High | Low, but slightly better with "safety value." | Low, but slightly better with safety value | High after identification and locked/ramped for fixed period. |
| Cost Transparency | High | Low | Low | Low |
| Political Feasibility | Low | Low | High | High 5 |

Anticipated Forms of Mitigation

| Method | Description | Challenges |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| Credits & Offsets (Cap & Trade) | Initially allocated/auctioned credits and new offsets developed from mitigation projects | Efficiency of system (credits). Monitoring and verification of offsets. |
| Capital Investment | Carbon capture and storage | Expensive, uncertain, large supporting infrastructure and institutional support. |
| Fuel Switching | Nuclear, IGCC, natural gas | Expensive, longer-term investments, questionable development realization (cost, scope, reliability). |
| Renewables | Biomass, wind, solar, geothermal, hydro | Expensive, varying reliability, uncertainty (cost recovery) |
| Efficiency Improvements | Automotive Appliances Building measures Demand-Side Mgt. Demand Response | Good short run opportunities, significant, but limited in scope. Also require investment to reach pay-back. |


Credits and Offsets

How Does Cap & Trade Work?



How Does Cap & Trade Improve Overall Emissions?

Framework creates "scarcity" because the initial regulatory "design" is intentionally "short" in the aggregate. More stringent caps result in more expensive mitigation costs (higher marginal credit prices), other things equal.




How Are Allowances Determined?

Allowances are offered to participants based upon two different methods.

| Allocated | Auction |
|---|--|
| Regulator makes an administrative determination of who gets allowances. | Market makes the decision about who gets the allowances. |
| Allocations made on a wide range of considerations and metrics including: Metric (Heat Input, Output) Baselines (Year, Updates) Growth Pool Set-Asides | Periodic auction (think "eBay") for the credits. Can be done in a variety of methods, but general approach is to allocate credits to those with the highest willingness to pay. There is an important issue associated with what to do with "auction proceeds." Who gets those? |


Auction versus Allowance



Credits versus Allowances versus Offsets

- Credits or "certificates" are the legal property rights that can be traded in the market to establish a value for a fixed amount of emissions (in tons). Trades can occur in commodity markets or bilaterally between a willing buyer and seller.
- Allowances are the free issuances of credits established by some policy, rule, or both. States can often be given an allowance, which in turn are allocated (in some fashion) to market participants. With auction, allowances are offered to the market to discovery value and collect revenues, which in turn, are invested (in theory) in mitigation technologies or other social goals.
- Offsets are another form of credit (1) created by a qualifying reduction in emissions (over compliance) or (2) created by qualifying investment in a technology certified to reduce (or serve as sink) for emissions. Comprised of mandatory and voluntary markets. Allows developer to monetize (and profit from) over-compliance and increases the supply of available credits (liquidity).

Chicago Climate Exchange Daily Closing Prices




Renewable Energy Credits and Carbon Offsets

| Method | Renewable Energy Credits ("REC") | Carbon Offsets |
|----------------------|---|---|
| Type of Projects | RECs only come from renewable energy projects such as solar, wind, geothermal, biofuels, etc. | Offsets can come from renewable projects but also include the collection and storage of carbon through reforestation; ocean and soil collection; and capture and storage efforts. |
| Units of Measurement | MWh | Metric tons |
| Design | Forward looking, focused on building a clean energy economy and providing incentives for the creation of renewable energy. | Oriented in the present, dealing with preventing greenhouse gases from entering the atmosphere right now; or removing carbon after it has been released. |
| Markets | Too many to list | Chicago Climate Exchange, Voluntary Carbon Standard Program |
| Distribution | Allocated by state or regulatory authority; any amount needed over allocation must be purchased. | Purchased to offset "carbon footprint" |

Renewable Energy Credits and Carbon Offsets

RECs can come from any renewable energy project. Offsets can only come from projects that go beyond business-as-usual. When an offset is purchased, the greenhouse gas reductions it represents would never have happened unless the offset was purchased. With RECs, there's no such guarantee. Because of this difference, RECs can only be converted to offsets if they come from a project that goes beyond business-as-usual.

New Renewable Energy Generators



Louisiana Carbon Offset Projects

| Louisiana Offset Projects | Operator(s) | Location | Size | Type of Impact | Emissions Impact | |
|--|--|---------------------|-----------|------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Bayou Pierre Floodplain Project | PowerTree Carbon Company Environmental Synergy Inc. | Red River Valley | 500 acres | Absorption | 2,000 | metric tons per year |
| Northwest Airlines Forest Carbon Project | The Nature Conservancy | Franklin Parish | 524 acres | Absorption | NR | |
| Bayou Bartholomew Climate Action Project | The Nature Conservancy | Morehouse Parish | 247 acres | Absorption | NR | |
| St. Landry Parish Solid Waste Disposal District | Trinity Carbon Management | Beggs, Louisiana | | Methane destruction | >15,000 | metric tons per year |

Regulatory Issues (Utility and Environment)

- Under auction or allocation, who's ox gets gored? How are stakeholder interests balanced?
 - Allocations on emission factors preference big base-load coal generation.
 - Allocations on generation will preference the efficient.
 - Will auctions preference utilities that can securitize purchases with regulated customers?
- Who gets rewards for "good" pre-regulation decisions and who gets penalties for following the rules when the rules get suddenly changed?
 - Will this ultimately create prudence issues down in the future?
 - Does this create competitive distortions in wholesale markets? (i.e., utility v. IPP)
- How does regulator incent credit management? (hoarding, PGA-FAC-type incentives, PBR)
- Auction revenues (assume in-state auction): who gets the money? Options:
 - Offsets to rate case increases
 - Climate related programs (renewables, education, research)
 - Non-climate related programs (low-income or economic development)


Capital Investments

What is Carbon Capture and Storage?

- Carbon Capture and Storage ("CCS") is a method of managing and reducing CO₂ in the atmosphere
- Carbon dioxide is captured from a power plant or other industrial source, compressed and put in a pipeline where it travels to a nearby oil or gas field or "sequestration site".
- CO₂ can be safely sequestered (or stored) in depleted oil or natural gas fields for an indefinite period of time.
- CO₂ can be held underground by the same solid rock layers that have held the trapped oil and gas for millions of years.

Carbon Capture and Sequestration

Carbon capture and sequestration ("CCS") involves the capture of CO_2 from power plants and other large industrial sources, its transportation to suitable locations, and injection into deep underground geological formations for long-term sequestration.




Big Picture Cost Estimates


| Process | Cost range per metric ton of CO_2 captured | Comments |
|--------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Capture from power plant | \$15.00 - \$75.00 | Net cost |
| Transportation | \$1.00 - \$8.00 | Per ~155 miles via pipeline |
| Geological storage | \$0.50 - \$8.00 | Not including EOR revenue |
| Monitoring of storage | \$0.10 - \$0.30 | Depending upon regulation |
| Total estimated costs | \$16.60 - \$ 91.30 | |

Fuel Switching

CO2 Emissions Rate by Fuel Type




Total Overnight Cost for New Plants



Electric Generation Capacity Additions by Region and Fuel (2007-2030)


All electricity demand regions are expected to need additional, currently unplanned, capacity by 2030. The largest amount of new capacity is expected in the Southeast (FL and SERC), which represents a relatively large and growing share of total U.S. electricity sales and thus requires more capacity than other regions.





Example 1 Center for Energy Studies

Announced Nuclear Plants




locations that are yet to be determined.

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy; and Nuclear Energy Institute.

Renewables


States with Renewable Portfolio Standards



Note: As of July 2009; *Ohio and Pennsylvania include separate tier of non-renewable 'alternative' energy resources. Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency.


Total Overnight Cost for New Plants

Resources are typically uneconomic without additional support



Potential Louisiana RPS Requirements

If generation were to follow current trends and increase each year, the federal RPS would require 1,960 MW of renewable capacity for Louisiana's investor owned utilities and 2,338 MW for the total State, by 2020.



Demand Reduction and Efficiency

What are Utility Conservation Programs

Programs commonly referred to as "demand side management" – attempt to encourage more efficient use of electricity.

Energy efficiency programs: programs that encourage more efficient energy (kWh) consumption or fuel switching (i.e., new natural gas end uses).

Load management programs: programs designed to encourage more efficient peak demand (kW) usage.

Energy Efficiency Resource Standards

4

ID: Energy Plan sets conservation – DR and MI: 1% annual energy savings from EE as priority resources

WA: pursue all cost effective conservation: MN: 1.5% annual savings based on ~10% by 2025

OR: IOU 2008 goals 34 MW; administered by Energy Trust OR

CA: 8% energy savings; 4,885 MW peak reduction by 2013 (from '04)

NV: EE up to 25% of RPS: ~5% electric reduction by 2015

UT: EE earns incentive credits in RE goal

CO:11.5% energy savings by 2020 ~ 3,669 GWh (from '08)

NM: 10% retail electric sales savings by 2020 (from '05)

NE: Interim Energy Plan stresses multi-sector EE improvements

KS: Voluntary utility programs

OK: PSC approved quick-start DR utility EE and DR programs

TX: 20% of load growth by 2010, using average growth rate of prior 5 years

HI: 30% electricity reduction: ~4,300 GWh by 2030 (from '09)

prior year's sales

prior 3-years average, to 2015

IA: 5.4% energy savings by 2020 ~ 1.5% annual

WI: RPS requires utility EE

IL: reduce energy use 2% by 2015 and peak 0.1% from prior year

OH: 22% energy savings by 2025 (from '09); reduce peak 8% by 2018

KY: proposed RPS-EE to offset 18% of projected 2025 demand

ME: 30% energy savings; 100 MW peak electric reduction by 2020

VT: 11% energy reductions by 2011 (2% annual) administered by Efficiency VT

MA: 25% of electric load from DSR, EE by 2020: capacity and energy

> NY: reduce electric use 15% by 2015 from levels projected in 2008

CT:4% energy savings (1.5% annual) and 10% peak reduction by 2010 (from '07)

RI: reduce 10% of 2006 sales by 2022

NJ: BPU proceeding to reduce consumption, peak

DE: Sustainable Energy Utility charged with 30% energy reduction by 2015

PA: reduce use 3%; peak 4.5% by 2013 as % of 2009-10 sales

MD: reduce per capita electricity use and peak by 2015 (from '07)

VA: reduce electric use 10% by 2022 (from '06)

WV: EE & DR earn one credit for each MWh conserved in the 25% by 2025

NC: EE to meet up to 25% of RPS by 2011

TVA: reduce energy use 25% and cut peak 1,400 MW by 2012 (from '08)

EE only as part of an RPS law, rule or goal

EERS by regulation or law (stand-alone)

Voluntary standards (in or out of RPS)

EE goal proposed/being studied


Other EE or DSM rule or goal

Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Louisiana CO2 Emission Trends


Gross CO2E per GDP and GSP, U.S. and Louisiana

Louisiana has been following emissions reduction trends similar to overall U.S. since 1990.




CO2 E per Btu of Fossil Fuel Consumption, Louisiana and U.S.

Louisiana tends to be more efficient, however, in emissions per unit of energy consumed.




Louisiana Share of Total U.S. CO2 Emissions




Louisiana CO2 Emissions per Sector, 1980 – 2005

Louisiana carbon emissions have been driven primarily by moderate amounts of growth in transportation and electric power generation sectors.




Example 1 Center for Energy Studies


U.S. and Louisiana CO2 Emissions per Sector, 2008




Louisiana and U.S. Electric Power Fuel Mix

In the U.S., coal represents 48 percent of the electric power fuel mix (capacity basis). In Louisiana, 75 percent of the electric power generation is fueled by natural gas. Coal only represents 12 percent of the electric power fuel mix (capacity basis).






Louisiana and U.S. Electric Power Fuel Mix




Potential Costs to Louisiana


Historic and Projected Louisiana Emissions




Estimated Cost of Emission Credit Deficits, Louisiana Total




Historic and Projected Louisiana Emissions – Power Generation




Louisiana CO2 Emissions by Utility



| 1.1 | · | | |
|-----|------|----------------------------------|--|
| | ilsu | Center for Energy Studies | |



Louisiana CO2 Emissions by Generator Type



Total CO2 Surplus/Deficit by Year and Utility Growth Case

| | | | | Annual CC | 02 Surplus or | Deficit by Utili | ity | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| | ELI | ENO | EGSI | CLECO | SWEPCO | MUNI | COGEN | IPP-COAL | IPP-GAS | STATE TOTAL |
| | | | | | (to | ns) | | | | |
| 2012 | (500,441) | (102,878) | (535,624) | (580,615) | (195,601) | (184,388) | (734,628) | (1,393,920) | (160,005) | (4,388,099) |
| 2015 | (892,090) | (185,188) | (964,167) | (1,045,157) | (354,882) | (331,913) | (1,422,166) | (2,397,477) | (281,320) | (7,874,361) |
| 2020 | (2,234,168) | (364,525) | (1,873,688) | (2,028,156) | (1,117,499) | (651,937) | (2,615,415) | (4,358,474) | (537,728) | (15,781,589) |
| 2025 | (2,827,940) | (871,174) | (2,606,150) | (2,831,478) | (1,462,209) | (867,874) | (3,342,109) | (5,387,710) | (707,380) | (20,904,024) |
| 2030 | (3,895,585) | (1,162,784) | (3,131,540) | (3,777,193) | (1,778,270) | (1,036,213) | (4,035,466) | (6,279,190) | (876,104) | (25,972,345) |
| 2035 | (4,675,083) | (1,406,812) | (3,504,733) | (4,277,071) | (2,019,842) | (1,146,626) | (4,880,040) | (6,880,813) | (997,824) | (29,788,844) |
| 2040 | (5,427,784) | (1,685,363) | (3,872,278) | (4,806,203) | (2,856,581) | (1,253,471) | (5,364,271) | (7,466,141) | (1,127,964) | (33,860,056) |
| 2045 | (5,857,677) | (1,860,762) | (3,991,927) | (5,026,263) | (3,017,210) | (1,299,380) | (5,608,672) | (7,696,836) | (1,214,330) | (35,573,057) |
| 2050 | (6,046,280) | (1,907,695) | (4,052,490) | (5,102,519) | (3,144,094) | (1,326,228) | (5,781,919) | (7,813,607) | (1,290,491) | (36,465,323) |

Total CO2 Cost by Year and Utility, Growth Case

| | | | | A | nnu | al Abatem | ent | Costs | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----|-----------|------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | ELI | ENO | EGSI | CLECO | 5 | WEPCO | | MUNI | COGEN | PP-COAL | PP-GAS | STATE TOTAL |
| | | | | | | (mil | lior | ı \$) | | | | |
| 2012 | \$ 103.0 | \$ 21.2 | \$ 110.2 | \$ 119.5 | \$ | 40.3 | \$ | 37.9 | \$ 151.2 | \$ 286.9 | \$ 32.9 | \$903.10 |
| 2015 | \$ 114.9 | \$ 23.8 | \$ 124.1 | \$ 134.6 | \$ | 45.7 | \$ | 42.7 | \$ 183.1 | \$ 308.7 | \$ 36.2 | \$1,013.87 |
| 2020 | \$ 178.1 | \$ 29.1 | \$ 149.4 | \$ 161.7 | \$ | 89.1 | \$ | 52.0 | \$ 208.5 | \$ 347.5 | \$ 42.9 | \$1,258.36 |
| 2025 | \$ 201.4 | \$ 62.0 | \$ 185.6 | \$ 201.7 | \$ | 104.1 | \$ | 61.8 | \$ 238.0 | \$ 383.7 | \$ 50.4 | \$1,488.73 |
| 2030 | \$ 262.8 | \$ 78.4 | \$ 211.3 | \$ 254.8 | \$ | 120.0 | \$ | 69.9 | \$ 272.3 | \$ 423.6 | \$ 59.1 | \$1,752.26 |
| 2035 | \$ 317.8 | \$ 95.6 | \$ 238.2 | \$ 290.7 | \$ | 137.3 | \$ | 77.9 | \$ 331.7 | \$ 467.7 | \$ 67.8 | \$2,024.91 |
| 2040 | \$ 375.4 | \$ 116.6 | \$ 267.8 | \$ 332.4 | \$ | 197.6 | \$ | 86.7 | \$ 371.0 | \$ 516.4 | \$ 78.0 | \$2,341.98 |
| 2045 | \$ 433.9 | \$ 137.8 | \$ 295.7 | \$ 372.3 | \$ | 223.5 | \$ | 96.3 | \$ 415.5 | \$ 570.2 | \$ 90.0 | \$2,635.13 |
| 2050 | \$ 487.1 | \$ 153.7 | \$ 326.5 | \$ 411.1 | \$ | 253.3 | \$ | 106.8 | \$ 465.8 | \$ 629.5 | \$ 104.0 | \$2,937.80 |
| NPV: | \$1,404.19 | \$395.16 | \$1,121.34 | \$1,320.04 | | \$677.51 | | \$373.20 | \$1,546.10 | \$2,364.10 | \$327.57 | \$9,529.21 |

Preliminary and Not for Citation

Note: Assumes credit cost of \$15/ton (escalated by 2% per year).

Residential Annual Bill Impact, Growth Case

| | | | Anr | nual Averag | ge Ratepaye | r Impacts (E | Bill Impact) | | | |
|---------|-------------|---------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------|------------|---------|-----------|
| | ELI | ENO | EGSI | CLECO | SWEPCO | MUNI (\$/bill) | COGEN | IPP-COAL | IPP-GAS | STATE AVG |
| | | | | | | | | | | · · · · |
| 2012 | \$56.99 | \$46.12 | \$90.82 | \$207.73 | \$111.34 | \$124.90 | n.a. | \$577.16 | n.a. | \$177.61 |
| 2015 | \$63.58 | \$51.78 | \$102.28 | \$233.98 | \$126.26 | \$140.72 | n.a. | \$621.02 | n.a. | \$199.38 |
| 2020 | \$98.55 | \$63.31 | \$123.13 | \$281.08 | \$246.16 | \$171.37 | n.a. | \$699.07 | n.a. | \$247.47 |
| 2025 | \$111.44 | \$134.88 | \$152.96 | \$350.62 | \$287.61 | \$203.67 | n.a. | \$771.90 | n.a. | \$292.78 |
| 2030 | \$145.41 | \$170.55 | \$174.14 | \$442.92 | \$331.53 | \$230.36 | n.a. | \$852.16 | n.a. | \$344.60 |
| 2035 | \$175.84 | \$207.97 | \$196.31 | \$505.33 | \$379.33 | \$256.73 | n.a. | \$940.88 | n.a. | \$398.19 |
| 2040 | \$207.71 | \$253.66 | \$220.71 | \$577.81 | \$545.93 | \$285.73 | n.a. | \$1,038.85 | n.a. | \$460.57 |
| 2045 | \$240.08 | \$299.77 | \$243.70 | \$647.17 | \$617.48 | \$317.36 | n.a. | \$1,147.08 | n.a. | \$518.26 |
| 2050 | \$269.52 | \$334.36 | \$269.08 | \$714.62 | \$699.81 | \$351.97 | n.a. | \$1,266.38 | n.a. | \$577.77 |
| Percent | Increase or | n a Typical I | Bill | | | | | | | |
| 2015 | 3.8% | 3.1% | 6.1% | 13.8% | 7.4% | 8.3% | n.a. | 38.5% | n.a. | 11.8% |
| 2020 | 4.2% | 3.4% | 6.7% | 15.3% | | 9.2% | n.a. | 40.6% | n.a. | 13.0% |
| 2025 | 6.3% | 4.1% | 7.9% | 18.0% | 15.8% | 11.0% | n.a. | 44.8% | n.a. | 15.9% |
| 2030 | 7.0% | 8.5% | 9.6% | 22.0% | 18.1% | 12.8% | n.a. | 48.5% | n.a. | 18.4% |
| 2035 | 9.0% | 10.5% | 10.7% | 27.3% | 20.4% | 14.2% | n.a. | 52.5% | n.a. | 21.2% |
| 2040 | 10.6% | 12.6% | 11.9% | 30.5% | 22.9% | 15.5% | n.a. | 56.8% | n.a. | 24.0% |
| 2045 | 12.3% | 15.0% | 13.1% | 34.2% | 32.3% | 16.9% | n.a. | 61.5% | n.a. | 27.3% |
| 2050 | 13.9% | 17.4% | 14.1% | 37.6% | 35.8% | 18.4% | n.a. | 66.6% | n.a. | 30.1% |

Industrial Annual Bill Impact, Growth Case

| Annual Average Ratepayer Impacts (Bill Impact) | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|---------|----------|----------|---------|-------|-------|----------|---------|-----------|
| | ELI | ENO | EGSI | CLECO | SWEPCO | MUNI | COGEN | IPP-COAL | IPP-GAS | STATE AVG |
| | | | | | (\$/1 | DIII) | | | | |
| 2012 | \$5,042 | \$1,273 | \$10,338 | \$52,090 | \$2,957 | \$111 | n.a. | \$10,519 | n.a. | \$11,761 |
| 2015 | \$5,299 | \$1,351 | \$10,970 | \$55,278 | \$3,163 | \$118 | n.a. | \$10,666 | n.a. | \$12,407 |
| 2020 | \$7,443 | \$1,492 | \$11,958 | \$60,168 | \$5,586 | \$130 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$13,950 |
| 2025 | \$7,622 | \$2,885 | \$13,455 | \$67,952 | \$5,913 | \$140 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$15,549 |
| 2030 | \$9,008 | \$3,304 | \$13,872 | \$77,779 | \$6,170 | \$144 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$17,308 |
| 2035 | \$9,866 | \$3,647 | \$14,168 | \$80,372 | \$6,396 | \$145 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$17,924 |
| 2040 | \$10,556 | \$4,027 | \$14,427 | \$83,234 | \$8,336 | \$146 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$18,800 |
| 2045 | \$11,051 | \$4,313 | \$14,427 | \$84,436 | \$8,541 | \$147 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$19,113 |
| 2050 | \$11,236 | \$4,356 | \$14,427 | \$84,436 | \$8,767 | \$148 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$19,178 |

Industrial Annual Bill Impact, Growth Case

| | | | | | ge Ratepayer In | | | | | |
|------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------|----------|---------|----------------------|
| | ELI | ENO | EGSI | CLECO | SWEPCO (\$/b | MUNI ill) | COGEN | IPP-COAL | IPP-GAS | STATE AVG |
| 2012 | \$5,042 | \$1,273 | \$10,338 | \$52,090 | | \$111 | n o | \$10,519 | | \$11,761 |
| 2012 | \$5,042 \$5,299 | \$1,273 \$1,351 | \$10,338 \$10,970 | \$52,090 \$55,278 | \$2,957 \$3,163 | \$118 | n.a. | \$10,519 | n.a. | \$12,407 |
| | | | | | | | n.a. | | n.a. | |
| 2020 | \$7,443 \$7,622 | \$1,492 \$2,895 | \$11,958 \$12,455 | \$60,168 \$67,052 | \$5,586 \$5,012 | \$130 \$140 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$13,950 \$15,540 |
| 2025 | \$7,622 | \$2,885 | \$13,455 | \$67,952 | \$5,913 | \$140 \$144 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$15,549 |
| 2030 | \$9,008 | \$3,304 | \$13,872 | \$77,779 | \$6,170 | \$144 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$17,308 |
| 2035 | \$9,866 | \$3,647 | \$14,168 | \$80,372 | \$6,396 | \$145 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$17,924 |
| 2040 | \$10,556 | \$4,027 | \$14,427 | \$83,234 | \$8,336 | \$146 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$18,800 |
| 2045 | \$11,051 | \$4,313 | \$14,427 | \$84,436 | \$8,541 | \$147 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$19,113 |
| 2050 | \$11,236 | \$4,356 | \$14,427 | \$84,436 | \$8,767 | \$148 | n.a. | \$10,876 | n.a. | \$19,178 |
| Percent Ir | ncrease on a T | ypical Bill | | | | | | | | |
| 2012 | 5.0% | 1.3% | 10.3% | 52.1% | 3.0% | 0.1% | n.a. | 10.5% | n.a. | 11.8% |
| 2015 | 5.2% | 1.3% | 10.8% | 54.2% | 3.1% | 0.1% | n.a. | 10.5% | n.a. | 12.2% |
| 2020 | 7.2% | 1.4% | 11.5% | 57.8% | 5.4% | 0.1% | n.a. | 10.5% | n.a. | 13.4% |
| 2025 | 7.2% | 2.7% | 12.7% | 64.0% | 5.6% | 0.1% | n.a. | 10.2% | n.a. | 14.7% |
| 2030 | 8.3% | 3.1% | 12.8% | 71.9% | 5.7% | 0.1% | n.a. | 10.0% | n.a. | 16.0% |
| 2035 | 8.9% | 3.3% | 12.8% | 72.8% | 5.8% | 0.1% | n.a. | 9.9% | n.a. | 16.2% |
| 2040 | 9.4% | 3.6% | 12.8% | 73.9% | 7.4% | 0.1% | n.a. | 9.7% | n.a. | 16.7% |
| 2045 | 9.6% | 3.8% | 12.6% | 73.5% | 7.4% | 0.1% | n.a. | 9.5% | n.a. | 16.6% |
| 2050 | 9.6% | 3.7% | 12.3% | 72.1% | 7.5% | 0.1% | n.a. | 9.3% | n.a. | 16.4% |

Conclusions


The Role of Public Policy in Energy Markets

- Public policy is important in shaping and/or influencing factors that determine energy supply and demand.
- Policies, in turn, are a function of the times in which they are developed. For instance:
 - 1990-2004: Relatively lower energy prices, high capacity/supply availability.
 - 2004-2009: Relatively high energy prices, tight capacity/supply constraints.
 - 2010: Depressed prices, depressed demand, uncertainty.
- Conventional wisdom in policy formulation (implicit and explicit) has been that markets are not working, or have not worked effectively.
- Last five years has been reflected by a significant degree of policy activity to address these perceived market failures.

Examples of State and Federal Policy Activism


| State Policy Activism | Federal Policy Activism |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Infrastructure Riders | GHG Regulation/BACT Stds |
| Generation Preferences and Special Cost Recovery Mechanisms | CAIR/CATR/CAMR |
| Revenue Decoupling | DOE Appliance Standards |
| Weather Normalization | EPA Hydro Frac Investigation |
| Energy Efficiency Goals | GOM Moratorium |
| Renewable Portfolio Std. | Repeal of Drilling Tax Incentives |
| Inflation Adjustment Factors | Stimulus Funding EE/RE |
| R & D Programs | Tax Credits EE/RE |
| Societal Benefit Charges | Price Supports/Mandates (Biofuels) |

U.S. Base Rates as a Share of Total Retail Rates – Electric and Natural Gas




Annual Percent Change in Base Rate versus Fuel Rate – Natural Gas

Base rates (gas) have increased by as much as 36 percent since 2005, compared to fuel rates that have decreased by 25 percent.



Annual Percent Change in Base Rate versus Fuel Rate – Electric



Regulatory Issues – Risk and Uncertainty

- Carbon regulation, and new forms of environmental regulation can lead to both risk and uncertainty.
 - <u>Risk:</u> quantitatively susceptible measure of the consequences of a bad outcome occurring. (probability of bad event times the consequences of bad event occurring).
 - <u>Uncertainty:</u> subjective measure of the consequences of a bad outcome occurring. (difficulty in discerning probably and/or outcome).
- There are costs for both risk and uncertainty and one of the biggest, and most important regulatory issues in dealing with these challenges is assigning risk and uncertainty to various parties/stakeholders.
 - Which parties are best suited to bear the cost of risk and uncertainty?
 - How are parties incented to bear risk and uncertainty? (rates v. ROE)
 - What rewards are offered if any? How does this fit into the existing obligation to serve?
 - Regulators and regulatory risk and uncertainty.
 - What contracting/performance standards are established?

Questions, Comments and Discussion



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